On January 13, 2026, the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security said it would review export licenses for Nvidia’s H200, AMD’s MI325X, and similar chips to China on a case-by-case basis, if security conditions are met. That followed a December announcement that those products could ship to approved Chinese customers. The conditions, as BIS described them, include showing that U.S. customers will not lose capacity, that the buyer screens customers, and that the product is independently tested in the United States.
That is a loosening relative to a blanket “presumption of denial.” It is not an open door. Case-by-case means a queue. A queue means a calendar risk for anyone whose revenue depends on a yes.
The rule moved twice
Reporting in June described a second turn. After the administration dropped the earlier “AI Diffusion Framework” in May, BIS guidance — covered by Al Jazeera and summarized in later research notes — treated license requirements as applying to companies headquartered or parented in China even when they operate outside China. Politico reported in July that license applications were piling up, the Entity List had gone months without additions, and former officials alleged a gap before May 31 guidance closed sales of restricted chips to China-headquartered buyers abroad.
I cannot verify every allegation in that Politico piece from here. What is on the public BIS site is enough for operators: the January H200/MI325X policy exists, and so does a February settlement. Applied Materials and Applied Materials Korea agreed to pay $252 million to BIS for illegal exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China, the bureau announced February 12.
A license delay is a delivery date. A penalty is a product-line autopsy.
Seoul joined the list this week
On September 1, South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources added high-performance AI chips and certain lithography, etching, and deposition equipment to its strategic export-control list. Exporters need ministry approval. Aju Press reported the change implements more than 80 updates from four international regimes, including Wassenaar.
If you sell tools, parts, or packaging into that chain, you now have two governments that can pause a crate. Large equipment makers have export counsel. A $40 million supplier often has a spreadsheet and a freight forwarder.
What a board should ask
What share of trailing revenue would stall if the top three end-use cases needed a new license tomorrow? Who owns screening — sales or a named compliance lead? Has the bill of materials been split into “ships without a license / needs a license / do not quote”?
Do not wait for the next headline to draw that map. BIS already showed it will both open a window and fine a household name. Korea just made the window smaller for some dual-use gear. The mid-tier does not get a press conference. It gets a denied AES filing.
Sources
- BIS, “Department of Commerce Revises License Review Policy for Semiconductors Exported to China,” Jan. 13, 2026 (also listed on BIS news updates)
- BIS on X, Applied Materials settlement, February 12, 2026 (the thread states an approximately $252 million penalty)
- BIS, Applied Materials $252 million penalty, Feb. 12, 2026
- Politico, “China hardliners take aim at Commerce Department official,” July 8, 2026
- Aju Press, “Korea adds semiconductors to export control list,” Sept. 1, 2026